

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

1. SIR FRANCIS FESTING recalled that at their meeting on Tuesday, 20th September, 1960, they had invited the Foreign Office to consider the desirability of making a new political approach on Berlin Contingency Planning to the other tripartite powers, without waiting until the new American administration assumed office. He invited the Foreign office representative to give his views on the question.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office shared the anxieties of the Chiefs of Staff over the continued political differences between the tripartite powers on Berlin contingency planning. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that if the more elaborate military measures were carried out they would effectively call the Russian bluff and cause them to climb down, a belief which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations and current East German activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent diplomatic exchanges the Russians had in no way disclaimed their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this or to attempt to interfere with civil aircraft on the pretext of preventing meetings of "revanchistes", then the situation would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a Summit Conference. In engineering this conference they would aim to create the maximum humiliation for the United States so as to gain the strongest moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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(b) The tripartite Governments had already agreed to the conclusion of a paper prepared by the Embassies in Bonn which stated that if Allied air contingency plans were put into effect the appropriate Allied Air Commanders should have discretion to order flights over 10,000 feet or below 2,500 feet in the Berlin corridors. This point should be mentioned in the letter to General Horatius.

(c) Although JACK FINN informed that the unanimous agreement of the Three Powers was required to carry out the evacuation of nationals, there was nothing to stop them acting unilaterally if they so desired. However, it was difficult to visualise circumstances when such unilateral action might be warranted.

(d) The three Embassies in Bonn were responsible for dealing with the Federal German Republic over arrangements connected with Berlin contingency planning, and since they had approved the Plan it could be assumed that German participation in planning was adequately covered.

(e) The speed of modern fighter aircraft made it impossible to guarantee that transport aircraft could be protected by discount fighter aircraft. Moreover, the Russians might not need to resort to interception by fighters since it appeared that a SAM complex was being constructed around Puslin.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(2) Approved the draft letter to General Horatius, subject to deletion of paragraphs (i) and (ii).

(3) Instructed the three Embassies to draft letter to General Horatius to include their views as expressed in para (e).

(4) Took note that the Chairman of the Defence Staffs would submit his views to the Minister of Defence and seek his approval before the letter was sent to General Horatius.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.Y.
27TH SEPTEMBER, 1960.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

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G.O.U.(60)52TH MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 22ND SEPTEMBER, 1960

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: G.O.U.(60)52th Meeting, Minute 6)

SIR FRANCIS PWHITEY reported that at their meeting on Tuesday, 20th September, 1960, he had invited the Foreign Office to consider the possibility of making a new political approach on Berlin Contingency planning to the other tripartite powers, without waiting for the new American administration assumed office. He invited the Foreign Office representative to give his views on the matter.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office shared the anxieties of the Chiefs of Staff over the continued political differences between the tripartite powers on Berlin contingency planning. The fundamental point of difference lay in the American belief that if the more elaborate military measures were carried out they would effectively call the Russian bluff and cause them to climb down, a belief which was not shared by the United Kingdom.

Recent events, such as Mr. Krushchev's speech to the United Nations and current East German activities, had not caused the Foreign Office to change their view that the Russians did not intend to create a real crisis over Berlin until the new United States President was in office. For example, in recent diplomatic exchanges the Russians had in no way disclaimed their responsibility for Allied traffic. However, if they were to do this or to attempt to interfere with civil aircraft on the pretext of preventing meetings of "right-wingers", then the situation would be quite different. He believed that the Russian purpose in creating a new Berlin crisis would be to force the Western powers, particularly the United States Government, into a summit conference. In engineering this conference they would aim to make the maximum humiliation for the United States so as to gain the strongest moral position from which to obtain concessions.

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Turning to the question of the advisability of making a friendly approach to the Americans at this stage, he pointed out that the present U.S. Administration was on its last legs and the Foreign Office believed that it would be fruitless to attempt to thrash out any matters of major importance with them now. He had just returned from Washington where it was notable that the forthcoming election tended to make the Americans unwilling to discuss minor matters whilst on major matters they tended to take a much tougher line than usual. Berlin contingency planning was a major matter and if we attempted to discuss this problem with them now, he believed that they would adopt an even more inflexible attitude.

In discussion the point was made that there was evidence that the Russians were exercising restraint on the East Germans. It seemed improbable that Khrushchev was bluffing in his desire for a Summit Conference after the elections and accordingly it seemed unlikely that he would play his Berlin card before the New Year.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(1) Took note of the views express by the Foreign Office Representative.

I. Operation JACK PINE

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(Previous Reference: COM(60)51st Meeting, Minute 4)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Air Ministry, which examined a tripartite plan (JACK PINE) for Berlin Airlift and Air Acces Contingency which had been prepared by CINC USAFE, approved by General Horstedt and forwarded to the tripartite military authorities for the preparation of national supporting plans.

SIR THOMAS PIKE said that the JACK PINE Plan collated existing United Kingdom airlift plans and was generally acceptable subject to revision in the light of certain points made in the report by the Air Ministry. However, he wished to withdraw two of these points. ~~The first, paragraph 7(b)(i), referred to the need-to-point-out that the exercise of the NATO powers and full preparations for aerial war were required before initial air operations were undertaken; this view had already been expressed to General Horstedt on another occasion, and he believed that it would be impossible to restate it in this context. Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(ii), recommended that imminent support by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan;~~ he believed that General Horstedt should be allowed freedom of action in his contingency planning and that accordingly the Committee should not support this recommendation.

In discussion the following points were made:-

(a) It was essential that the ration for engagement by fighters and the notion to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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SIR THOMAS PIKE said that the JACK PINE Plan collated existing United Kingdom airlift plans and was generally acceptable subject to revision in the light of certain points made in the report by the Air Ministry. However, he wished to withdraw two of these points. The first, at paragraph 7(b)(i), referred to the need to point out that the concurrence of the NATO powers and full preparations for global war were required before tactical air operations were undertaken; this view had already been expressed to General Norstad on another occasion, and he believed that it would be impolitic to restate it in this context. Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(ii), recommended that indirect support by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan; he believed that General Norstad should be allowed freedom of action in his contingency planning and that accordingly the Committee should not support this recommendation.

In discussion the following points were made: -

- (a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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C.O.S. (60) 52TH MORTAR BATTALION HELD ON
19 NOVEMBER 1953.

WHEEL COVERING PLATE

(Presented by Defendant - 300(60)5710-Subsidiary, Minnco, 5)

A. SIR FRANCIS PHILIPS reported that at their meeting on Friday, 20th September, the Foreign Ministers invited the other tripartite powers to consider the Berlin Conference approach without waiting for the new Foreign Minister's arrival in Berlin. Sir Philip said that he had advised his government to accept the invitation.

Mr. KILLICK: (Very briefly) I have no Foreign Office
news to give you. The Foreign Office has the unclassified
intelligence which shows that the powers in Asia
and Europe believe that the main point of difference lay in
the American belief that the more aggressive military measures
were carried out they would result very well, the Russian belief
was that they should then be called down, a belief which was not shared by
the United Kingdom.

Non at events such as Mr. Roosevelt's speech to the United States and similar East German activities, had not caused the United People to change their view that the Russians did not want to create a socialist order over Berlin which was the United States President was in office. In recent days the People's Government had no war proclaimed their opposition to the United States. However, they were to do nothing for Allied trifles. However, they were to do nothing to attempt to interfere with either the United States or the Soviet Union. They were to do nothing in the direction of preventing meetings of representatives of the two powers. He believed that the Russian purpose was to create a new Berlin crisis which would be forced upon the United States. He believed that the United States would have to come to the Conference. In any negotiations he would be able to get the United States to agree to the following: that the United States would give the United States a position from which to obtain concessions.

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

THE COMMITTEE

- (2) Approved the report by the Air Ministry, subject to deletion of paragraphs 17(b) (i) and (ii).
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a draft letter to General Norstad in accordance with their views as expressed discussion.
- (4) Took note that the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff would submit the report to the Minister of Defence and seek his approval to the reply to be sent to General Norstad.

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- (b) The tripartite Governments had already agreed to the conclusion of a paper prepared by the Embassies in Bonn which stated that if Allied air contingency plans were put into effect the appropriate Allied Air Commanders should have discretion to order flights over 100 miles at below 2,000 feet in the Berlin corridors. This point should be mentioned in the letter to General Norstad.
- (c) Although JACK LINN informed that the unanimous agreement of the Three Powers was required to carry out the evacuation procedure, there would be no objection to acting unilaterally if they were desired. However, it can difficult to visualize circumstances when such unilateral action might be undertaken.
- (d) The three Embassies in Bonn were responsible for dealing with the Federal German Republic over arrangements for the evacuation plan. They were informed and since they had approved the plan it could be assumed that German participation in planning was adequately covered.
- (e) The speed of modern fighter aircraft made it impossible for interceptors to protect transports. Interceptors could be protected by fighter fighter aircraft. Moreover, the Russians might not need to resort to interception by fighters since it is believed that a U.S./U.S. campaign was being conducted against Berlin.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the proposed letter to General Norstad subject to deletion of reference to paragraph (1).
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to draft a copy of the proposed letter to General Norstad and to advise him of their views as expressed in the letter.
- (4) Took note that the letter would be sent to the National Staff would contain a copy of the letter to the Minister of Defense and some brief notes on what would be said to General Norstad.

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27TH SEPTEMBER, 1960

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Turning to the question of the advisability of using a French approach to the Americans at this stage, he pointed out that the present U.S. Administration was on its last legs and the Foreign Office believed that it would be fruitless to attempt to influence any major important with them now. He had just returned from Washington where he had been told that the forthcoming election tended to make the Americans unwilling to discuss minor matters whilst on major matters they tended to take a much tougher line. Then again, in view of contingency planning which had been agreed, if we attempted to dislodge this problem with the new Government, then they could adopt an even more inflexible attitude.

In discussion the point was made that there was evidence that the Russians were exercising restraint on the East Germans. It seemed improbable that Khrushchev was blufing in his desire for a Sino-Soviet Conference after the elections and accordingly it seemed unlikely that he would play his Berlin card before the U.N. soon.

THE COMMITTEE:

(1) Took note of the views express by the Foreign Office Representative.

Operation JACK RINE

TYPE SETTING

(Previous Reference: GOU(60)51:1 Notice 1474-1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Air Ministry, which examined a tripartite plan (W.M. 101/RX) for Berlin Airlift and Air Acces Contingency which had been prepared by GIMC USAFE, approved by General Norstad and forwarded to the tripartite military authorities for the preparation of national contingencies plans for the

SIR THOMAS PARK,¹ C.B.E., M.A., and JACK DUNN, Plan collected
Meeting United Kingdom aircrew, who had been asked to consider the plan subject to revision in the light of certain points which had been raised by the
Secretary of State for Air. However, he wished to withdraw two
of these points from consideration, namely paragraph 7(b)(ii) and paragraph 4-to
the effect that the plan should be revised so as to include a period of
full preparation for Indict-1 before it was required to begin.
He advised that the period of full preparation before
initial air operations were undertaken, in this view had already
been agreed and he intended to make another circular, and he
believed that it would be necessary to make a few changes in the present circular.
Secondly, paragraph 7(b)(iii), recommended that Indictment
by fighter aircraft should be excluded from the plan.
A balanced force of fighters and bombers should allow freedom of
air in his contingency planning, and that accordingly the
Committee should not run off this suggestion.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) It was essential that the rules for engagement by fighters and the action to be taken by transport aircraft should be more precisely stated.

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